O controle de constitucionalidade das políticas públicas e a arguição de descumprimento de preceito fundamental

Abstract

ABSTRACT The purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate that the claim of non-compliance with a fundamental principle presents itself as an appropriate instrument to control the constitutionality of public policies, being thus legitimate the intervention of the Judiciary, especially through its directing body the Federal Supreme Court, as guardian of the Constitution and its final judge. Promoting the Country to a Legal Democratic State, the Constitutional Letter of 1988 introduced new instruments for direct defense of the Constitution before the Supreme Court, where the ADPF can be found among them, emphasizing the concentrated model. Regulated by Law No. 9.882/99, the main purpose of the claim of non-compliance is to protect the fundamental constitutional principles that, as from their institution, have their own protection mechanisms. In order to develop this topic, it was important to outline the definition of public policies, using as a starting point the concept of Ruling Constitution, a model adopted in the Constitutional Letter of 1988 and characterized by the presence of a set of constitutional rules that, by imposing objectives and duties on the State, binds the performance of the constituted Powers. Throughout this study it became clear that non-compliance with constitutional rules that provide for the adoption of governmental programs and policies aiming to defend public interest gives rise to judicial control, demonstrating the need to commence a new reading of the theory of separation of Powers and demanding a more active posture of the Judiciary, which can and must intervene to enforce compliance with the constitutional rules.